Category: The Sahel

Decidedly, the Malian state is struggling to find its footing and rise to the level of its responsibilities toward the populations placed under its protection and the international community.

The initiative of the Prime Minister, Moussa Mara, to travel to Kidal, despite the opinions expressed regarding the opportuneness of this visit, showed a total lack of political sense. It must be said that the President of the Malian Republic in person had previously declared that he would not negotiate, whereas the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), the HCUA (High Council for the Unity of Azawad), and the MAA (Arab Movement of Azawad) had been waiting for months for the new government to finally decide to resume the course of these negotiations as provided for by the Ouagadougou agreements of June 2013. This is the only possible path to sustainably decide the future of the relations between Mali and Azawad.

As soon as he was elected, following elections made possible by a responsible benevolence from the politico-military groups of Azawad, the President of Mali had made particularly excessive remarks in an interview with the newspaper “Le Monde”, which already showed the tone he wished to give to his mandate regarding the Azawad question. Indeed, he had declared that it is the International Community that “forces” Mali “to negotiate with an armed group”. Given the context of these past two years, this attitude of Mali’s leaders is beginning to despair its partners and risks further hardening the positions of the other parties directly involved or concerned by this conflict.

This official posture generates hatred from the populations of the South toward those of the North, whom they often do not even know. Most of the time, this ignorance of the realities on the ground by certain decision-makers in charge of managing the country reveals a level of awareness close to zero on the part of the Malian authorities. The gap that prevails between the underlying design of all official initiatives to definitively finish with these “troublemakers of Kidal” and the reality on the ground is simply staggering. As if the affairs staining the political class in the South could be forgotten and erased by diverting attention to a new crisis in the North. The objective is also to make people forget the absurd economic decisions and the various score-settling currently underway within the Bamako political class. What can we say then regarding international realities and the march of the world!

This path taken long ago by the Malian state remains just as catastrophic for the children of the South and the North. The pain of their families and the tragedies resulting from these irresponsible behaviors visibly do not bother the leaders who are supposed to protect them. The choice consisting of throwing the populations of the North to the dogs in the name of the sacred idea of the intangibility of borders, among other things—with all pretexts being used and manipulated with Machiavellian zeal—stems from an irresponsible attitude that is in no way assumed and that has already generated thousands of deaths for decades.

The Malian soldiers killed during the recent clashes in the North are the latest victims of this appalling misunderstanding. And moreover, this does not seem to have troubled Prime Minister Moussa Mara in the least, who declared on May 20, 2014, in Kidal at 6 p.m., before his extraction: “Bamako is in Kidal today, the army has carte blanche to raze everything if necessary, this is the opportunity to finish it,” according to Fabien Offner, the special envoy of “Libération”. “This is the opportunity to finish it!” These words, so charged with meaning and telling a lot about the true designs of this multi-pronged enterprise and the capacity of those who are supposed to have strong nerves to manage the affairs entrusted to them, should be engraved on each of the tombs of the soldiers who died on this “occasion”…

Proof is thus made that the Malian system, beyond successive governments, is incapable of proposing a realistic and serious solution to the conflict pitting their country against Azawad. Since the military option has clearly shown its limits, it is high time to face facts and deal with the reality on the ground.

Realism also means finally understanding that clientelism and the buying of consciences, while they may allow an election to be won, cannot overcome the determination of peoples to enjoy their most elementary rights, notably that of ensuring their own survival!

This penchant for ease constitutes one of the main elements that delay awareness and inhibit the capacity to see problems and seek viable solutions for them.

The international community, which allowed the Malian army and administration to return to Azawad, thus sees its efforts thwarted by a Malian policy visibly too far from realities, busy as it is putting the country’s meager resources into buying an airplane, while other priorities await, notably recovering peace and creating the conditions for the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees who are suffering for the nth time in camps, despite the generosity of neighboring countries.

Impunity

The military and political hierarchy of Mali will, sooner or later, have to answer for the massacre of thousands of Tuareg and Moor civilians. Reconciliation between these communities and the state will come at this price. It is illusory to want to build or rebuild as long as this issue is not taken seriously and properly addressed by the Malian state. The international community also bears part of the responsibility for this impunity, which contributes to driving these communities away from the Malian state.

The will of peoples is inalienable, and that of the Tuareg people, displayed since the colonial era, is to enjoy their right to self-determination.

The Tuaregs have already paid a heavy price to live in peace with their neighbors and in harmony with the rules governing the functioning of the international community.

Elections

The elections that took place in 2013 did not reflect the will of the populations of Azawad, a significant portion of whom are still refugees in neighboring countries (Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso) and therefore did not take part in these elections. This situation raises the question of the legitimacy of certain people to decide the future of these populations—an anomaly that could have been mitigated by a genuine willingness of the authorities resulting from these elections to seriously and thus sustainably resolve this issue, thereby shortening the sufferings of these populations.

Security in the Sahel

The question of security and stability in the Sahelo-Saharan strip today goes beyond the framework of Mali and Azawad. No future policy can take place without the genuine participation of the communities living throughout these regions!

The MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)

The weakness of its means and the difficulty in countering the propaganda of the Malian authorities still prevent the MNLA from making certain parts of the Azawadi population understand its national project—a situation quite widespread in this type of conflict across all of Africa.

We have heard pen mercenaries decree that the MNLA did not represent the entirety of the Tuareg community of Azawad, while forgetting to specify that this Movement does not identify as Tuareg, because it wishes to carry the aspirations of all and defend the interests of all the communities that traditionally populate Azawad (notably Tuaregs, Songhai, Peuls, and Arabs). All national liberation organizations face this type of propaganda from their adversaries, who thus think they are delegitimizing their causes. The same arguments had been used against the FLN (National Liberation Front) in Algeria, the ANC (African National Congress) in South Africa, the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) in Guinea-Bissau… to name only Africa.

The difference in contexts does not prevent this convergence on the substance. It is always a portion of the sons of a people who decide on their own to carry the aspirations of this people and to make the necessary sacrifices. The adherence of the people, like that of the hesitant, is revealed in broad daylight when the leaders of such an organization prove their sincerity, determination, and credibility in defending aspirations that are often widely shared.

The demonization of the MNLA is counterproductive, because sooner or later, it will be necessary to conclude negotiations with it and finally take seriously the demands of which it is the heir and which it carries today!

Seeking at all costs to create and maintain the confusion between the MNLA and terrorism or to confine this organization into an ethnicist logic is a negative signal expressing in all its magnitude the lack of will of the current Malian authorities to assume their responsibilities and take the situation of their country seriously. The authorities must put an end to the policy of the ostrich and look reality straight in the face. The populations of Azawad have already paid a heavy price in the fight against permanent insecurity in the sub-region.

Autonomy

The autonomy of Azawad is imposing itself today not because it is a demand of the MNLA, but by the imperative necessity for Mali to accept a reality that is obvious to everyone, except visibly to a certain Malian elite! Indeed, as long as the integrity of the country is respected, the debate on the politico-administrative organization of the state should suffer no taboos.

It is easy to see today that the Malian state in its current configuration is obviously not capable of administering and securing the entire territory with its current institutions.

The populations of the North suffer the consequences of insecurity more than any other Malian! They are therefore the first to wish for the definitive return of peace.

The halt of development projects, tourism, and other activities that allowed the emergence of an embryonic economic fabric penalizes first and foremost the communities of Azawad!

Abdoulahi ATTAYOUB

aabdoulahi@hotmail.com

Temoust

In light of current events in the Sahel, the international community is gradually becoming aware of the need for a comprehensive approach to security in the sub-region. We must therefore insistently remind it that this approach must necessarily involve the definitive resolution of the conflict that has pitted the populations of the regions concerned against the central states of Mali and Niger for fifty years.

The massive intervention hatched last year and made effective as of January 11, 2013, to reconquer Azawad and place it back under Mali’s authority is a strong political act that de facto places France at the heart of the antagonisms shaking the Sahelo-Saharan space. Long ignored by the international community, the conflict opposing these regions to the central states of Niger and Mali is beginning to arouse a certain interest thanks to the war declared against the jihadists established in the region for over ten years. Indeed, the opportunistic emergence of these groups obscures the understanding of ordinary tensions that unfortunately are at the origin of the current situation in Mali.

Since the creation by the French colonial administration of Niger and the territory that Modibo Keïta baptized Mali, the populations inhabiting the north of these two countries have never ceased to claim their right to be truly associated with the political and economic management of these states. This demand, which has always been considered completely incongruous, has allowed the central power to regularly organize terrible reprisals against civilian populations. This situation has left those who have carried it for decades no other choice than that of arms to make themselves heard.

Today, a geopolitical reconfiguration of this space seems inevitable in order to draw lessons from the failure of post-colonial systems and to face the current challenges of the sub-region. Stability and security in the Sahel inevitably go through the resolution of the Tuareg question in Mali and Niger.

Latest developments

France has therefore decided to commit its army to the Sahel in an attempt to contain the progression of jihadist ideology. This intervention is all the more spectacular because its theater is a region whose sufferings have long been ignored by the international community. France, after having drawn the current borders of Niger and present-day Mali, had set up political systems at the time it renounced its colonial pretensions, to which it transferred all powers. These new administrations were thus built around certain established bodies, in particular the army, which thus monopolized the institutions of the new states, totally excluding communities whose traditional territories had nevertheless been arbitrarily integrated into these new countries. Over time, we have had to admit that France had not seen fit, and had no intention of doing so, to organize follow-up and thus care about the interests of the populations and peoples whose future it had thereby and for a long time mortgaged. The colonial administration left behind states to be built whose populations had not freely chosen to share a common national project.

A trapped situation that the new Nigerien and Malian elites—created out of whole cloth at the time of these independences, and thus often not at all or barely rooted in the very terroir of the societies that were to compose these states—have never been able to defuse. The various Tuareg rebellions have been strong signs of this malaise. The malgovernance that has characterized these states has also largely prevented an awareness of these political elites, seemingly still in apprenticeship, from coming to light. The French umbrella has allowed Niger and Mali to stifle Tuareg demands by covering them up, notably on the international scene, even when massive human rights violations were committed by the armies of these countries against civilian populations.

Today, the birth of a new international jihadism and its arrival in the sub-region have changed the game and are disrupting through their consequences—which can no longer be hidden as they are so tragic—the very primary, and therefore very comfortable, frameworks elaborated by the official international community in order not to have to intervene. However, jihadist ideology remains an opportunistic phenomenon that poorly masks the political problems resulting from Mali’s inability to make its ethnocultural communities coexist in an equitable and peaceful manner, among other things.

Today, France’s return to its former colonies and the dimension taken by its commitment in the Sahel constitute a major event that will inevitably raise the question not only of its historical responsibility, but also of its role as a tutelary power over Mali and Niger.

However, the French intervention risks worsening the situation if it is not conducted with discernment and respect for local populations. Indeed, a military presence directed against the legitimate demands of the populations of Azawad risks precipitating the entire sub-region into a generalized conflict, from Chad to Mauritania. The abuses committed by the Malian army against Tuareg, Moor, and Peuhl civilian populations under the eyes of the French army risk giving rise to a certain distrust among these populations regarding French policy in the sub-region.

Proof has been made that the Malian and Nigerien armies are structurally incapable of securing the Sahelo-Saharan space. This is due to the very nature of their recruitment and the mismatch between these armies and the populations inhabiting the regions concerned. The experience of the past two decades has shown armies accustomed to behaving like occupying armies, and the populations still remember the massive massacres of the 1990s perpetrated in Mali and Niger.

Political uncertainties

If the Malian state has failed in its primary mission, which is to make the different peoples composing its population coexist in justice and equity, it is hard to see how it can legitimately rely on this failure to impose any solution on Azawad.

Consequently, the success of the French intervention can only be effective if the political problems that favored the emergence of armed groups in this region are genuinely taken into account. Traffickers of all kinds know that only the local Tuareg, Moor, Arab, Kountas, and Tubu communities can prevent them from engaging in their illicit activities. And, in the central part of this Sahelo-Saharan space, the Tuareg community is unavoidable in facing these threats that destabilize the sub-region.

Perspectives

Today, Mali and Niger must face facts and agree to question what has not worked for fifty years and to create the conditions for a fresh start in their governance system. This would put an end to cycles of violence and increase their capacity to face new challenges in terms of democracy, development, and security.

It is nevertheless curious to rejoice over the awakening of peoples through what has come to be called “the Arab springs” while blocking the expression of the peoples of the Sahel, who aspire to better governance and respect for their rights.

The international community would be well advised to accompany the increasingly numerous voices making themselves heard to place the rights of peoples at the center of an unavoidable geopolitical reconfiguration in this region. It would be illusory to want to stabilize the Sahelo-Saharan space without taking into account the legitimate aspirations of the peoples living there. Azawad is no exception to the rule.

The refoundation of the Malian state constitutes an absolute imperative to put an end to the instability that fosters insecurity and the proliferation of more or less mafiosi armed groups. The objective of this refoundation is the establishment of institutions adapted to the sociocultural realities of the country. Each community should feel at home in its traditional territory in a federal system or autonomy as broad as possible. This autonomy would take up the achievements of the National Pact to make explicit the special status and thus consecrate federalism in Mali or the autonomy of Azawad.

The dimension embodied by the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) today is inescapable for the sustainable stabilization and securing of the Sahelo-Saharan space. Indeed, the legitimacy and reality of the demands carried by the MNLA cannot be diminished by the shortcomings and organizational problems this Movement currently encounters. Even if the latter were to disappear like others before it, this question will remain; other Tuaregs and Azawadvis will pick up the torch as long as the populations of this Sahelo-Saharan space are not recognized in their identities and in their rights over the lands of their ancestors. The MNLA is more representative of the entire Tuareg people than the Malian government is of all the communities composing the population of Azawad!

For the Tuareg movement, it is above all about shaking off the domination of the political system in force for over fifty years in Mali and Niger, which has failed to take into account the diversity and aspirations of the populations concerned.

If the Tuaregs continue to be marginalized and massacred amidst the general indifference of the international community, they will end up making a pact with the devil to exist and fight those they have identified as their true enemies. The Tuareg movement is in a position to weigh in on the sub-region and assume a major role in the stabilization and securing of this space. The Tuareg movement’s primary vocation is not to fight Islamism, but if this political current were to merge into violent groups wishing to impose by force an order contrary to the interests of the Tuareg people, then it must be fought.

The Tuareg people, through its emerging youth, is beginning to become aware of its interests and to take a more pragmatic look at the geopolitical evolutions of the sub-region. France, which at the time of decolonization allowed—doubtless more out of indifference, synonymous at this level with irresponsibility, than Machiavellianism—to sideline the Tuaregs from the political management of the new states into which it had integrated their territories, owes it to itself today to contribute to repairing this injustice. Should it persist in wanting only to reimpose by force the frameworks it had already put in place in the aftermath of independences, it would find itself out of step with the march of time and that which the Tuaregs refuse to abandon: their future!

Human rights violations

The Malian state and the leaders who currently illegitimately claim to take charge of it must answer before the ICC for crimes committed against Tuareg, Moor, and Peuhl populations for fifty years. This is one of the major conditions for any reconciliation between Azawad and Mali. Any arrangement that ignores this requirement is doomed to failure.

Proponents of “one and indivisible Mali” do not realize the absurdity of their slogan, while day by day they demonstrate their inability to denounce the massacres of Tuareg, Moor, and Peuhl civilian populations. The incapacity of the Malian political class is not even limited to the foregoing, which is already enormous; it also proves incapable of imagining, even on paper, a crisis exit that would be the fruit of consultation between the various communities of the country. In the absence of clearly identified institutions and state, the international community must assume its responsibilities and set up a neutral provisional administration capable of organizing the refoundation of the state and its institutions.

Let us recall that the use of a few Tuareg personalities by the Malian political system does not constitute a significant element in itself. This method has already been used extensively in a classic context of clientelism, opportunism, and fatalism inherent to any conflict of this type. These Tuaregs had chosen to blindly support a policy that was essentially directed against their community and of which they will in the long run be the biggest losers themselves.

Rethinking the Sahelo-Saharan space

In reality, the relentless targeting of the MNLA is a way of fighting the Tuareg community in its aspiration to reject any ethnocentrist domination that the current Malian political system seeks to perpetuate.

Abdoulahi Attayoub

President of ODTE (Organization of the Tuareg Diaspora in Europe)

Touaregs.europe@gmail.com

Lyon, February 24, 2013